Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin

Authors Eli Ben-Sasson; Alessandro Chiesa; Christina Garman; Matthew Green; Ian Miers; Eran Tromer; Madars Virza
Year 2014
Project Zcash
License CC BY 4.0
Official Source Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/349

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“Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin” is a peer-reviewed paper presented at the 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. It formalizes decentralized anonymous payment schemes that use zk-SNARKs to hide a payment’s origin, destination, and amount while allowing the network to verify that the payment is valid. Zcash later implemented ideas from this work, with substantial protocol changes over time; the 2014 paper and today’s Zcash protocol are not identical.

Publication and Context

Bitcoin transactions are pseudonymous, but their public ledger exposes transaction amounts and address relationships. Zerocoin, the 2013 predecessor, could obscure a coin’s origin but still revealed destinations and amounts and supported fewer payment features. Zerocash proposed a fuller private-payment construction: a user could prove that a payment followed the protocol rules without publishing the payment’s sender, receiver, or value.

How a Shielded Payment Works

A shielded payment is built around a note, a record of coin ownership that includes a value, recipient information, and cryptographic randomness. The note is represented on-chain by a commitment placed in a Merkle tree. A spender proves that a note is included in the tree and that they are authorized to spend it, without revealing which note it is. The recipient’s output is encrypted so that the intended recipient can identify and recover it.

When a note is spent, the transaction publishes a corresponding nullifier. Validators reject a nullifier that has already appeared, preventing the same note from being spent twice without exposing which note was used. The proof also enforces value conservation, so valid inputs must balance with outputs and any permitted fee.

What the Paper Reported

The paper’s abstract reports that its Zerocash transactions were less than 1 kB and took under 6 milliseconds to verify. These are results for the construction described in the 2014 paper; they should not be read as a benchmark for every later Zcash transaction or proof system.

Parameter Ceremonies and Trust Assumptions

The original Sprout proving parameters were generated in a six-participant multi-party ceremony in October 2016. The protocol was designed so the parameters remain secure if at least one participant destroys their secret randomness. If every participant’s secret contribution were compromised, an attacker could potentially create proofs for counterfeit value.

Sapling used a separate parameter-generation process. Its ceremony included a general-purpose Powers of Tau phase and a later phase specific to the Sapling circuits; Powers of Tau was not the name of Zcash’s original Sprout ceremony. Orchard, introduced with NU5 in 2022, uses Halo 2. The current protocol specification says Halo 2 parameters for a circuit are generated by the library and do not require parameter files, so Orchard does not depend on the Sprout/Sapling setup ceremony.

From the Paper to Zcash

Zcash launched in 2016 as an implementation of the anonymous-payment approach, then changed its shielded systems through later upgrades. Sprout and Sapling use different circuits and parameter sets; Orchard uses a newer proof system. Zcash also retains a transparent pool, where transactions do not receive the same sender, recipient, and amount privacy as shielded transfers. Privacy therefore depends on which pool and transaction path a user uses, not on the project name alone.

Related Terms

References

  1. Ben-Sasson, E., et al. (2014), “Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin,” IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. Read the original paper record and access the PDF. The abstract gives the original transaction-size and verification-time results summarized above.
  2. Zcash Foundation (2017), “Announcing the World’s Largest Multi-Party Computation Ceremony.” Read the ceremony announcement. It distinguishes the six-person Sprout ceremony from the Powers of Tau work planned for Sapling.
  3. Hopwood, D., et al., Zcash Protocol Specification. Read the current protocol specification. It documents the later note, commitment, nullifier, Sprout, Sapling, and Orchard designs.