MuSig2

Definition: MuSig2 is a two-round, n-of-n multi-signature protocol that lets multiple Bitcoin signers aggregate their public keys and cooperatively produce one ordinary Schnorr signature. The signature is compatible with BIP 340. Every signer included in the aggregate key must participate in a successful signing session; MuSig2 is not an m-of-n threshold-signature scheme.1

SchemeTwo-round, n-of-n Schnorr multi-signature protocol
SpecificationBIP 327 (Deployed; assigned March 22, 2022)1
Bitcoin useAggregate keys for shared spending, including Taproot key-path outputs1
Bitcoin Coremusig() descriptor key aggregation is supported from v30.0; signing support is listed from v31.03
DirectoryBitcoin Directory

How a MuSig2 signature is made

Each participant starts with an individual public key. The signers apply the specified aggregation algorithm to derive one shared public key. For a signing session, each signer creates a secret nonce and shares the corresponding public nonce. After the signers have the session information, each produces a partial signature. The partial signatures are checked and combined into a single Schnorr signature that can be verified against the aggregate key. Key aggregation can be prepared ahead of a spend; the signing session itself requires coordination among the participating signers.1

StageWhat happensResult
Aggregate keysParticipants provide the public keys that form the shared signing group.One aggregate public key, which can be tweaked for supported uses such as Taproot.
Exchange noncesEach signer generates a session-specific nonce and shares its public nonce with the group.The signers derive the session data used for signing.
Sign and combineEach participant creates a partial signature; the contributions are verified and aggregated.One BIP 340-compatible Schnorr signature.

Why use MuSig2 with Taproot?

A group can use an aggregate public key as a Taproot key-path output. When the group spends through that path, the transaction carries one public key and one signature rather than listing every participant’s key and signature on-chain. To an observer, a MuSig2 key-path spend can look like an ordinary single-key Taproot spend, even though multiple people coordinated off-chain to produce it. The protocol also supports tweaks used to derive keys and create Taproot outputs with key and script paths. This can make cooperative group spending more compact, but the hidden coordination still has to be implemented and managed safely by the wallets or signing software.14

MuSig2 is n-of-n, not threshold signing

In an n-of-n MuSig2 setup, all signers whose keys are in the aggregate must contribute to the signing session. If one signer is unavailable or refuses to participate, the group cannot produce the signature for that key. A threshold scheme is different: an m-of-n arrangement is designed to permit a defined subset of a larger participant group to sign. Wallets may combine MuSig2 with separate script-path recovery conditions, but that does not turn the MuSig2 key-path scheme itself into threshold signing. The recovery path and the key-path participants must be reviewed as separate parts of the policy.1

PSBT and software support

BIP 373 specifies fields for carrying MuSig2 participant keys, public nonces, and partial signatures in both PSBT version 0 and version 2. These fields let compatible wallet and signer software exchange the data needed for a MuSig2 session. Bitcoin Core’s current BIP notes list MuSig2 descriptor key aggregation and MuSig2 PSBT fields from v30.0, with signing support for the musig() descriptor listed from v31.0. That support is version-specific: it does not mean every wallet, hardware signer, coordinator, or recovery tool supports the same workflow. Before using a shared wallet, confirm compatibility across every participant’s software and test the full signing and recovery procedure.23

Security limits and nonce handling

MuSig2 is a protocol, not a turnkey wallet or a guarantee that a group’s custody arrangement is secure. Participants must agree on the correct keys, message, tweaks, and session data, and implementations must verify contributions and handle failures correctly. Nonce generation is especially sensitive: BIP 327 warns that running the signing step twice with the same secret nonce can expose a signer’s secret key from the resulting partial signatures. Implementations must follow the specification’s nonce-generation and session-handling requirements; users should rely on well-reviewed software and never copy or reuse secret nonce data. A protocol-level signature also does not protect funds if a participant’s device, backup, or key is compromised.1

History

  • March 22, 2022: BIP 327 was assigned to standardize MuSig2 for BIP 340-compatible multi-signatures; the BIP is marked Deployed.1
  • June 4, 2024: BIP 373 was assigned to define MuSig2 fields for PSBT v0 and v2, including participant keys, public nonces, and partial signatures.2
  • Bitcoin Core v30.0: The Core project lists MuSig2 descriptor key aggregation and PSBT fields as supported from this release.3
  • Bitcoin Core v31.0: The project lists signing with musig() descriptors as supported from this release.3

Page updated: November 10, 2026.

Related Terms

Related Articles

See Also

Sources

  1. Bitcoin Improvement Proposals. “BIP 327: MuSig2 for BIP340-compatible Multi-Signatures.” Assigned March 22, 2022. Status: Deployed. Accessed November 10, 2026. BIP 327.
  2. Bitcoin Improvement Proposals. “BIP 373: MuSig2 PSBT Fields.” Assigned June 4, 2024. Status: Complete. Accessed November 10, 2026. BIP 373.
  3. Bitcoin Core Developers. “BIPs Implemented by Bitcoin Core.” Accessed November 10, 2026. Bitcoin Core BIP implementation notes.
  4. Bitcoin Core Developers. “Output Script Descriptors.” Accessed November 10, 2026. Bitcoin Core descriptor documentation.